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Abstract
In cooperative breeding systems individuals invest in the reproductive success of
others. In this paper, we study the emergence of cooperative breeding systems in
which reproductively active breeders receive investment from reproductively non-active
helpers. Our goal is to understand how the division of an investment between male and
female components of breeder fitness (i.e. the helper sex-allocation strategy) influences
the emergence of cooperative breeding itself. Using mathematical models, we arrive
at expressions for the inclusive-fitness advantage of helpful behaviour that generalize
previous work. These expressions assume an ecologically stable environment, and that
breeders make evolutionarily stable sex-allocation decisions. We find that, when breed-
ers are extremely resource limited, the sex-allocation strategy used by a helper can be
a key determinant in the success of helpful alleles. This finding, however, is restricted
to cases in which helpers have access to intermediate levels of resources. Surprisingly,
when helpers can make only a small investment in a recipient the division of the in-
vestment matters only very little to advantage of help. By contrast when resources
are extremely abundant, we obtain the unsurprising result that the manner in which
resources are allocated has little influence on the emergence of help. When breeders
have access to intermediate levels of resources we find increasing relatedness can, in
certain cases, inhibit the emergence of help. We also find that increasing the amount of
resources available to a breeder can impede help as well. Both of these counter-intuitive
results are mediated by evolutionary responses in breeder sex allocation.
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Introduction
In a cooperative-breeding system, certain individuals promote the reproductive success of
their neighbours, sometimes incurring large personal fitness costs as a result. In extreme
cases, reproductive skew is high, and helpful individuals must postpone or even forgo their
own reproduction to attend to offspring produced by a dominant breeder or breeding pair
(Griffin and West, 2003).
Helping among cooperatively breeding individuals is known to influence the evolution of
other social traits. In particular, sex allocation – the manner in which resources are divided
between male and female components of reproductive fitness – is known to be affected by
help (Emlen et al., 1986; Pen and Weissing, 2000a; Griffin et al., 2005; Wild, 2006). This
influence is commonly observed as a sex-ratio bias in cooperatively breeding species, with
investment favouring the more helpful sex.
Although the effect of helpful behaviour on sex allocation is quite well understood, the
same cannot be said for the effect that sex allocation has on the emergence of helpful
behaviour. What little we do know about the influence sex allocation has on helping in
cooperative-breeding systems has come from studies by Taylor (1992) and Johnstone and
Cant (2008). Using kin-selection models, both sets of authors outlined mathematical condi-
tions for the advantage of helping among reproductively active neighbours. Sex allocation
decisions did not factor into the conditions they developed, simply because any increase (resp.
decrease) in investment made in a given sex was balanced by a decrease (resp. increase) in
the reproductive value of that sex. Importantly, Johnstone and Cant (2008) did find that
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sex-specific patterns of dispersal could influence the emergence of helping. Consequently,
changes to sex allocation could influence helping indirectly by changing evolutionarily stable
dispersal rates (e.g. see Wild and Taylor, 2004).
At first glance, then, it might seem reasonable to expect sex allocation to play only
an indirect role in the emergence of cooperative breeding. However, none of the work that
could support such an expectation (i.e., Taylor, 1992; Johnstone and Cant, 2008) allowed the
donor itself to influence the allocation of its investment. Given that donor and recipient can
have different social-evolutionary perspectives in general (e.g. as in social insects: Trivers
and Hare, 1976), it seems more reasonable to expect sex allocation could be “tuned” to
maximize the donor’s incentive to help. In other words, a direct role for sex allocation in the
emergence of help ultimately appears plausible, despite the conclusions of previous studies.
In order to outline how sex allocation might directly influence the emergence of coopera-
tive breeding systems, we generalized two recent models (Wild and Koykka, 2014) to include
variable investment in male/female components of reproductive success and inbreeding. Our
models assume a high-degree of reproductive skew, in the sense that they track the invasion
of an allele that leads one individual to delay its own chance at reproduction in order to
improve the reproductive success of another.
As expected, we can easily identify a direct role for sex allocation in the emergence of
cooperative breeding. Specifically, we find that conditions for the advantage of help can
be made more/less stringent by altering the way in which a donor divides its investment
between the male and female components of recipient fitness. More importantly, we show
why one should expect such dependence to occur: selection on breeder allocation implies
that maximum advantage is achieved by a helper who allocates its resources like resource-
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unlimited breeders. Finally, we evaluate how competition among kin can alter this basic
result, and the consequences of following what parent does for the emergence of help.
The sections that follow describe our models and results in three parts. The first part
details the population dynamics that underlie our evolutionary argument. In the second part
we determine the evolutionarily stable (ES) sex-allocation strategy used by a breeder in the
absence of help. And in the third part we develop the conditions for the advantage of help
offered to a breeder with ES sex allocation.
Population Dynamics
Although we extend Wild and Koykka (2014), the population dynamics that underlie our
model follow theirs closely. We begin by considering a population whose individuals do not
engage in any form of helpful behaviour. These individuals are diploid, sexual, and (for
mathematical convenience) simultaneous hermaphrodites.
There are two different kinds of individuals in a genetically monomorphic population:
breeders and floaters. Breeders are reproductively active individuals. Each breeder is as-
sociated with one breeding territory, and no two breeders share territories. By contrast,
floaters are not reproductively active, though they are reproductively capable. Floaters are
not associated with any breeding territory.
We census the population at discrete, evenly-spaced points in time. Let F (t) and B(t)
denote the number of floaters and breeders, respectively, censused at the beginning of time
step t. Following census, each breeder produces one viable oocyte with probability p~. If
viable, the oocyte is fertilized by some breeder in the population. With probability φ self-
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fertilization occurs, and with probability 1 − φ fertilization is accomplished by a uniform
random breeder in the population. The resulting offspring becomes either a breeder or
a floater in the next time step depending on the specific model scenario (No Territory
Inheritance or Territory Inheritance, described below).
Each breeder survives from one time step to the next with probability sb. When a breeder
survives, it retains its breeding territory, and any offspring produced by that breeder dis-
perses to become a floater. When a breeder dies, one of two things can occur. In our No
Territory Inheritance (NTI) Model, we assume that offspring dispersal precedes all breeder
mortality events. In this case offspring cannot fill a vacancy left by a dead parent; instead,
offspring disperse to become floaters, and vacated territories simply vanish. In our Terri-
tory Inheritance (TI) Model, we assume that all breeder mortality events precede offspring
dispersal. In this case, an offspring will fill a vacancy left by a dead parent rather than
dispersing to become floaters. Territory inheritance is an important incentive for helping in
cooperative-breeding systems (Stacey and Ligon, 1991). More importantly (as the reader
will see) the TI model will allow us to consider the effects of competition among kin, whereas
the NTI model will not.
Floaters survive from one season to the next with probability sf . A fraction of the
floaters that survive become breeders; the remaining fraction stay in the floater class. The
probability that a surviving floater becomes a breeder is modelled as 1/(1 + aB(t)) for some
constant a > 0, which is essentially Beverton-Holt density dependent competition (Britton,
2003). This is a decreasing function of the number of breeders B(t), and so reflects an
important kind of ecological constraint faced by cooperative breeders (Emlen, 1982a,b).
The size of the population in the long-run is determined by a particular combination of
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parameters. This combination is called the basic reproduction number (R0), and in this model
it describes the expected number of newly established breeding territories produced on an
established breeding territory when population densities are low. For the NTI Model we have
R0 = p~sf/(1− sb), and for the TI Model we have R0 = p~sfsb/((1− sb)(1− p~)) (Wild and
Koykka, 2014). It can be shown that, when R0 < 1, the population tends to extinction over
time, but when R0 > 1 the numbers of breeders and floaters in the population, respectively,
tend to positive steady-state values (Wild and Koykka, 2014, see Appendix A). We disregard
the marginal case R0 = 1, here, and assume that R0 > 1.
Breeder’s ES Sex Allocation
In this section we use the population dynamics above to develop an inclusive-fitness argument
for the ES sex-allocation strategy used by a breeder in the absence of help. Our results
hold for both the NTI Model and the TI Model, and they can be verified using more formal
invasion analyses (Courteau and Lessard, 2000, see Appendices C-F). We use the population
dynamic models (seen in Appendix A) to determine whether sex allocation strategies are
evolutionarily stable. Alongside this more formal approach, the inclusive-fitness argument
is used to explain the invasion condition biologically.
We treat the sex-allocation strategy used by a breeder as a continuous trait. The trait
determines the fraction of resources a breeder devotes to reproduction through male function,
and is controlled at a single autosomal locus. There are two alleles at the locus in question,
namely resident and mutant, with additive effects on the trait. Additivity allows us to think
of a resident as having one sex-allocation strategy, α, and of a mutant as having another
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sex-allocation strategy, β (Taylor and Frank, 1996)
We suppose that each breeder has kb resources (e.g., measured in terms of calories) to
allocate to either male or female reproductive function. Allocation to female function costs
c~ (e.g., measured as calories per unit of function), and allocation to male function costs c|.
It follows that a breeder using strategy X = α, β is able to “purchase” kb(1 − X)/c~ units
of female reproductive function, and kbX/c| units of male reproductive function.
Until now, the probability with which a breeder produced a viable oocyte has been
treated as a constant, p~. In addition, all breeders had been assumed to compete on
an equal basis for (non-self) fertilizations; a breeder’s relative competitive ability is p|.
Now, we treat p~ and p| as a function of kb(1 − X)/c~ and kbX/c|, respectively. We
consider two different paradigms for the functional forms of these reproductive functions,
namely diminishing returns and logistic. In the diminishing returns paradigm, each unit of
investment in reproductive function does less than the previous unit. Mathematically,
p~ ≡ p~(X) = 1− exp
{
−kb
c~
(1−X)
}
and p| ≡ p|(X) = 1− exp
{
−kb
c|
X
}
.
In the logistic paradigm, p~ and p| have regions of increasing and then diminishing rates of
return on investment. Mathematically,
p~(X) =
[
1 +
(
1
ε~
− 1
)
e−kb(1−X)/c~
]−1
and p|(X) =
[
1 +
(
1
ε|
− 1
)
e−kbX/c|
]−1
,
where p~(1) = ε~ and p|(0) = ε| (i.e., no resources are allocated towards either female
or male reproductive function, respectively). A comparison of the diminishing returns and
logistic paradigms can be seen in Figure 1. Fig 1
Following Shaw and Mohler (1953), if W (X,α) is the fitness of an X-strategist in a
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population otherwise fixed for the resident strategy, then
W (X,α) = rb,~
p~(X)
p~(α)
+ rb,|(1− φ)p|(X)
p|(α)
, (X = α, β) (1)
where rb,~ = (1 + φ)/2 and rb,| = 1/2 express the relatedness between a breeder and its
reproductive output through female and male function, respectively (Appendix B). The
term (1− φ) appears in equation 1, because a breeder can only achieve reproductive success
through male function when another breeder reproduces via outcrossing (probability 1−φ).
The mutant strategy will invade whenever W (β, α) > W (α, α) = 1. However, it is enough
to focus on W (β, α) when determining the ES breeder trait, α∗. If α∗ (between zero and
one) is an ES trait, then in the diminishing returns paradigm
∂W (β, α)
∂β
∣∣∣∣
β=α=α∗
= −rb,~
(
kb
c~
)
1− p~(α∗)
p~(α∗)
+ rb,|(1− φ)
(
kb
c|
)
1− p|(α∗)
p|(α)
= 0 , (2)
and in the logistic paradigm
∂W (β, α)
∂β
∣∣∣∣
β=α=α∗
= −rb,~
(
kb
c~
)
(1− p~(α∗)) + rb,|(1− φ)
(
kb
c|
)
(1− p|(α∗)) = 0 , (3)
(Taylor, 1996; Hamilton, 1964). In general, we must solve equations (2) and (3) numeri-
cally. We have also verified that in the diminishing returns paradigm solutions to (2) are
evolutionarily stable – using the population dynamic models – in the sense that they cannot
be invaded by rare mutants (Maynard Smith and Price, 1973), and in the sense that they
are evolutionary attractors (see Appendices D and E) (Christiansen, 1991; Courteau and
Lessard, 2000).
In the logistic paradigm the strategy α∗ that satisfies equation (3) is only ES when
1
c~
(
p~(α
∗)− 1
2
)
+
1
c|
(
p|(α
∗)− 1
2
)
> 0 .
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We are guaranteed that α∗ is ES when both p~ and p| are in the region of diminishing
returns—above the dashed line in Figure 1. When both p~ and p| are in the region of
increasing rates of return on investment, α∗ is not evolutionarily stable, leading to an evo-
lutionary branching point—below the dashed line in Figure 1 . From here on out we will Fig 1
assume that p~ and p| follow the diminishing returns paradigm.
In general we must resort to numerical solution of equation (2), but we can find solutions
for particular cases. For example, when the cost of investing in male and female reproductive
function is the same (c~ = c| = c), we find
α∗ =
c
kb
log
{
φ+
√
φ2 + (1− φ2)ekb/c
1 + φ
}
. (4)
When breeders are extremely resource limited (kb → 0+), we find
α∗ =
1− φ
2
, for all c~ and c| (5)
which is Hamilton’s (1967) well known local mate competition result. Finally, when resources
are in extreme abundance (kb →∞) we find
α∗ =
c|
c| + c~
, (6)
which leads to p~(α
∗) = p|(α∗) = 1− exp{−kb/(c| + c~)}, essentially Fisher’s (1930) result
for the advantage of equal production of the sexes. These results are proven in Appendices
D.4 (equation 5) and D.5 (equation 6) .
For intermediate values of kb, numerical solution of (2) shows that equations (5) and
(6) provide bounds on the ES sex-allocation strategy, α∗ (Figure 2). Like the expression in Fig 2
equation (4), numerically determined values of α∗ decrease with increasing self-fertilization
rates, φ. This relationship between α∗ and φ makes good sense: an increased self-fertilization
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rate implies that opportunities for breeders to compete for, and subsequently achieve, re-
productive success through male function become more limited, and so investment in male
function becomes more wasteful. Numerically determined values of α∗ also vary with costs
c~ and c|. Specifically, ES investment in one sex increases as the relative cost of that sex
decreases. Again, we see that the ES strategy shies away from wasteful investment.
Emergence of Helpful Behaviour
Change in Inclusive-Fitness Due to Help
Having established our understanding of a breeder’s ES sex-allocation strategy, we are ready
to investigate the emergence of helping. We consider a population that has achieved a steady
state, and has settled on the ES sex allocation strategy for breeders, α∗. Unlike the previous
section, we will have to analyse the NTI Model and the TI Model separately. The results of
the analyses are verified using population-genetic models in Appendix F.
We assume that helping is controlled by an autosomal locus that also controls natal
dispersal. This new helping/dispersal locus is independent of the locus determining sex
allocation, and has two alleles (again labelled mutant and resident). The resident allele
results in no change to an offspring’s dispersal behaviour. By contrast, the mutant allele
causes an offspring to delay dispersal for one time step with some small probability. During
the delay, a philopatric mutant offspring will help its associated breeder (i.e., its parent), but
that same offspring’s survival is not guaranteed (it survives the time step with probability
sh).
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A helper aids a breeder by increasing the breeder’s reproductive success. We assume that
a helper has kh resources that can be allocated to a breeder’s male or female reproductive
function. If γ is the fraction of a helper’s resources allocated to a breeder’s male reproductive
function, then with help a breeder’s ability to compete for fertilizations changes from p|(α
∗)
to q|(α
∗, γ) = 1− exp{−(kbα∗+ khγ)/c|}. Similarly, with help the probability with which a
breeder produces a viable oocyte changes from p~(α
∗) to q~(α∗, γ) = 1− exp{−(kb(1−α∗) +
kh(1− γ))/c~}.
To calculate the inclusive-fitness change (Taylor, 1992) of a mutant individual, call it ∆w,
we fix attention on a newborn individual who decides to remain on its natal territory and help
its parent for one season only. The calculation, itself, breaks the focal newborn’s inclusive
fitness into into direct and indirect components (Brown, 1987). Direct components describe
changes to an individual’s survival, as well as changes to its production of descendant kin.
Indirect components describe changes to an individual’s production of non-descendant kin.
We will begin with indirect benefits, then move on to direct costs and benefits.
For the NTI model we find that, by delaying dispersal to help, the mutant (a) receives an
indirect inclusive-fitness benefit due to increased breeder reproductive success, (b) receives
a direct benefit when it inherits its parent’s territory (the name “No Territory Inheritance”
refers to the fact that the dispersive resident phenotype is unable to inherit a parent’s
territory), and (c) pays a direct cost in the event that it dies before attempting to breed.
Mathematically,
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NTI Model:
∆w = p~(α
∗)
(
rh,~
q~(α
∗, γ)− p~(α∗)
p~(α∗)
+ rh,|(1− φ)q|(α
∗, γ)− p|(α∗)
p|(α∗)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a) indirect benefit
+ sh(1− sb)
(
p~(α
∗)
1− sb − 1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(b) direct benefit
− (1− sh)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(c) direct cost
, (7)
where rh,~ = (1 + φ)
2/4 expresses the relatedness between a helper and its parent’s repro-
ductive output via female function, and where rh,| = (1 + φ)/4 expresses the relatedness
between a helper and its parent’s reproductive output via male function. When ∆w is posi-
tive (resp. negative) helping confers a net advantage (resp. disadvantage), and the mutant
invades (resp. is eliminated). Equation (7) generalizes one presented in Pen and Weissing
(2000b) (their equation 25), and in Wild and Koykka (2014) (their equation 3.1).
For the TI model, a mutant that delays dispersal in order to help its associated breeder
again (a) receives an indirect inclusive-fitness benefit due to increased breeder reproductive
success, (b) receives a direct benefit when it inherits its parent’s territory, and (c) pays a
direct cost in the event that it dies before attempting to breed. However, in the TI model
there is a fourth effect, namely (d) an indirect effect due to kin competition. This fourth
effect is felt when a helper displaces the offspring that would have inherited the parent’s
territory had the helper dispersed (recall that the “Territory Inheritance” model ensured
that offspring could inherit a territory rather than disperse). Mathematically,
13
TI Model:
∆w = p~(α
∗)
(
rh,~
q~(α
∗)− p~(α∗)
p~(α∗)
((1− sh) + sbshvf ) + rh,|(1− φ)q|(α
∗)− p|(α∗)
p|(α∗)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
(a) indirect benefit
+ sh(1− sb)(vi − vf )︸ ︷︷ ︸
(b) direct benefit
− (1− sh)vf︸ ︷︷ ︸
(c) direct cost
− sh(1− sb)rh,~(p~(α∗)vi − q~(α∗)vf )︸ ︷︷ ︸
(d) indirect cost/benefit
, (8)
where vf = (1 − p~(α∗))/sb is the reproductive value (sensu Fisher, 1930) of a resident
floater, and vi = p~(α
∗)/(1 − sb) is the reproductive value of a resident that inherits its
parent’s breeding territory. Equation (8) generalizes an expression presented by Wild and
Koykka (2014) (their equation 3.2).
It is instructive to ask, what sex-allocation strategy exhibited by a helper would maximize
the inclusive-fitness change due to helping? Applying elementary calculus to equations (7)
and (8), respectively (Appendix G), we find that helping is promoted to the greatest extent
when γ is equal to
γmax = min
{
c|
c| + c~
+
(
kh
c|
+
kh
c~
)−1
log
(
v|
v~
)
, 1
}
(9)
where v| = 1 is the reproductive value of success achieved through the breeder’s male
function, and v~ = 1 (NTI Model) or v~ = (1 − sh) + shvf (TI Model) is the reproductive
value of success achieved through the breeder’s female function. The minimum appears in
the expression for γmax because it does not make biological sense for helper sex allocation to
exceed one. From equation (9), we see that the advantage of helping is greatest when helpers
in the NTI Model behave as resource-unlimited breeders (compare to equation 6), and when
helpers in the TI Model behave as resource-unlimited breeders who reduce investment in
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female function because of kin competition (compare to equation 6, and notice that the
second term in 9 is positive). To be clear, we do not claim that γmax is the phenotype that
helpers necessarily exhibit. Rather, we include γmax here (i) to highlight the fact that the
allocation strategy that best promotes the emergence of helping is, in general, not α∗, and
(ii) to serve as a reference point later, thus eliminating the need to consider γ in numerical
exploration of the model.
Remarks on Resource Availability
Helper sex allocation, γ, plays only a minor role in the emergence of helping whenever re-
sources are in great abundance (either kb or kh large). In those cases, total investment in
reproductive success is large enough that marginal returns on these investments are sub-
stantially diminished, and so it makes intuitive sense that the pattern of investment matters
little to a helper’s inclusive fitness. In fact, when resources are abundant, the emergence of
helping is determined primarily by direct benefits (terms b-c in equations 7 and 8) and kin
competition (term d in equation 8).
When only breeders are resource limited (or the cost of raising offspring independently is
high), the expressions for the change in inclusive fitness due to help simplify. In this scenario,
both equation (7) and equation (8) become,
NTI Model and TI Model (kb → 0+):
∆w =
(
1 + φ
2
)2 [(
1− e−kh(1−γ)/c~)+ c|
c~
(
1− e−khγ/c|)]− (1− sh) (10)
where we have used R0 > 1 implies that sb must tend to 1 as kb becomes small (i.e. as
p~(α
∗) becomes small). Notice that only the indirect benefit of helping and the direct cost
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of helping now feature in ∆w. When resources are scarce, population dynamics imply that
the positive and negative consequences of territory inheritance are negligible.
Turning our attention back to the indirect benefit and direct cost found in equation (10),
we can make two simple observations about the emergence of help in the low breeder-resource
limit. First, the emergence of helping is inhibited as the mortality of helpers (cost), 1−sh, is
increased. Second, the emergence of helping is promoted by an increase in either the rate of
self-fertilization (essentially, relatedness), φ, or the amount of resources invested by a helper
(essentially, the extent of the benefit), kh.
In addition to the two basic observations above, Figure 3 shows that the emergence of Fig 3
helping, as predicted by (10), is promoted as the cost of investing in female function, c~,
decreases. The effect of c~ makes sense in light of the fact that fitness gains through male
function are limited by oocyte availability: in order to achieve a successful fertilization one
needs something to fertilize. Figure 3 also shows that the effect of changing helper sex-
allocation, γ, is predicted to be modified by both the amount of resources available to a
helper, and the sex-specific costs of investing in breeder reproductive success. In particular,
we see that larger kh increases the range of γ values over which helping is advantageous for
a given cost (e.g., blue annotation in Figure 3c). This agrees with our earlier finding that
helper sex-allocation strategy plays almost no role in the emergence of help when resources
are extremely abundant. At the other extreme, we see that sex allocation has a limited role
to play in the emergence of help when kh is small. This is evidenced by the flattening of
curves in Figure 3 as kh is decreased. Overall, the role of γ is most prominent at intermediate
levels of kh. When helper sex allocation has a role to play, we see that increased allocation
to male function promotes (resp. inhibits) the emergence of help when γ is less than (resp.
16
greater than) c|/(c| + c~) (Figure 3). This result agrees with the expression for γmax in
equation (9), for both the NTI and TI Models (for the latter take the limit as kb tends to
zero).
As a supplement to Figure 3 we have included Figure 4 that shows the direct cost (helper
mortality) as a function of the ES sex allocation and assumes that a helper is using the
allocation strategy γmax. In accordance with Figure 3, Figure 4 also demonstrates that as Fig 4
the cost of female units of reproductive function decrease (resp. increase) helping is promoted
(resp. inhibited). In addition, Figure 4 shows that helping is promoted as more resources
are allocated towards female units of reproductive function, and in this scenario (kb → 0+)
since α∗ = (1− φ)/2, a smaller α∗ corresponds to increased relatedness.
Intermediate Resource Availability
In this section we relax the assumption that breeders are extremely resource limited, and
consider intermediate values of kb.
In this case, we find that increasing self-fertilization rate (φ) does not always increase
the scope for the emergence of helping. Specifically, in the NTI Model larger φ can inhibit
the emergence of help (Figure 5a). This result stems from the fact that larger φ promotes Fig 5
breeder investment in female function. In turn, increased breeder investment decreases the
marginal returns to helpers through breeder female function. Although marginal returns on
helper investment in male function are also increased, larger φ (i.e. more selfing) means that
gains through male function are less frequently realized. In the TI Model, stronger inhibitory
effects of increased φ are due to the negative effects of competition among relatives (Figure
17
6c). Fig 6
We also find increasing kb, itself, has mixed consequences for helping when breeders have
greater access to resources. In the NTI model, increasing kb (when c~ is sufficiently small)
reduces the marginal benefits awarded to helpers as described immediately above (Figure
5). A similar effect occurs in the TI model, but increasing kb has the added effect, there,
of decreasing the discrepancy between offspring survival with an without help—effectively
limiting the costs of competition among relatives (Figure 6). It should be noted that the NTI
result, here, is different from one reported by Wild and Koykka (2014). In Wild and Koykka
(2014) increasing the probability of offspring production (e.g. through larger kb) uniformly
improved the advantage of helping. Investment in that paper, however, was not divided
between males and females. Here, when increasing kb inhibits helping, it also increases
investment in male function (Figure 2a). Consequently, increasing kb can diminish the direct
benefit of helping via an evolutionarily labile breeder sex-allocation strategy.
Finally, we find that increasing helper resources (kh) increases the scope for the emergence
of helping all around (figure not shown). This result mirrors the result obtained in the small-
kb limit.
Discussion
Sex Allocation and the Advantage of Helping
Our goal with this paper was to investigate the ways in which sex allocation influences
the emergence of helping in cooperative breeding systems. Using an inclusive-fitness based
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model, we demonstrated that sex allocation can promote the emergence of helping in certain
situations. Specifically, we found that resource availability provides an organizing principle
that separates situations in which sex allocation plays a significant role in the emergence of
help from those in which it does not. When resources are abundant (equivalently, overall costs
of investment low) our model predicts that helper sex allocation strategy has little effect on
the emergence of helping—it is direct-fitness effects that matter in these cases. By contrast,
when resources are scarce (equivalently, overall costs of investment high) we find that helper
sex allocation strategy can be a determining factor in the emergence of help. Although
the result for the former case could likely have been developed with verbal reasoning alone,
exposition of the latter case required a mathematical model to ensure appropriate limits
were taken correctly.
Previous theoretical work has indicated that the sex allocation strategy adopted by a
helpful individual will play a limited role in determining the advantage of help itself (Taylor,
1992; Johnstone and Cant, 2008). That work, however, was based on the standard assump-
tion that breeders produce large numbers of offspring; in other words, breeders have large
amounts of resource at their disposal. Given that our model predicts a role for sex allocation
only in cases where resources are limited, we suggest that resource scarcity is responsible for
the difference between our predictions and those made elsewhere.
Our finding that helper sex allocation plays a significant role in the emergence of help in
resource-limited species makes one important prediction about helper behaviour in the field.
Emlen (1982a) argued that two very different kinds of ecological constraints contribute to the
emergence of cooperative breeding systems. He drew a distinction between constraints that
reduce the probability of establishing a breeding territory (e.g. habitat saturation, availabil-
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ity of mates), and those that limit the production of offspring once established (e.g. large
cost of raising offspring, equivalently insufficient resources to raise offspring). Emlen also em-
phasized that constraints like habitat saturation should predominate in stable environments,
whereas those like high costs reproduction should predominate in fluctuating environments.
Combining Emlen’s arguments with those made here, we predict that helper sex allocation
will have the greatest effect on helping in fluctuating environments where offspring produc-
tion, not habitat saturation, is the predominant ecological constraint. Granted, our model
includes habitat saturation, but the probability with which a floater becomes established in
our model is always 1/R0 which need not be small when resources are scarce (i.e., in the
limit kb → 0+).
Helper’s Perspective Versus Breeder’s Perspective and Some Spec-
ulation
In the course of analysing our model, we identified a helper sex-allocation strategy, γmax in
equation (9), that maximizes the advantage of help. We do not claim that this strategy will
necessarily be adopted by helpers. In fact, it seems unlikely to us that a de novo mutation
would simultaneously produce a helper and a maximally advantageous sex-allocation strat-
egy. Still, the fact that γmax differs from the ES breeder allocation strategy α
∗ may have
implications for what kind genetic evidence for helping is sought.
Before launching into a possible implication of the difference between γmax and α
∗, we
should address one source of potential confusion. It may seem surprising that the strategy
that maximizes helper’s inclusive-fitness benefit is not the same as the ES breeder strategy
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given that relatedness leads both helpers and breeders to weigh success through male function
and success through female function equally. After all, asymmetries in relatedness coefficients
are often responsible for differing perspectives and conflict over sex allocation (e.g. Pen and
Taylor, 2005; Wild and Taylor, 2005; Pen, 2006; Wild and West, 2009). Nevertheless, surprise
is not warranted because γmax is not an equilibrium result. Selection acts on breeder sex
allocation in the absence of help, ultimately leading the population to express a strategy
(α∗) that balances fitness returns through male function with those made through female
function. When helpful behaviour initially arises, then, the most effective helpers will not
have the same regard for sex-specific returns on fitness as that shown by the breeders they
attend. Instead, the most effective helpers will act as resource-unlimited breeders (or resource
unlimited breeders who express concern for kin competition, as in the TI Model), because
selection has effectively taken care of concerns associated with resource scarcity by acting
on breeders.
Given that we do not necessarily expect helpers to express γmax, then what significance
does it hold? One might argue that cases in which cooperative breeding successfully emerged,
are also likely to have been cases in which helpers had the ability to allocate resources in a
manner that was different from breeders. Rather than helper behaviour co-opting an existing
locus controlling breeder behaviour, successful invasions may have been supported by gene
duplication events that allowed helpers to express behaviours closer to γmax. Even though
present-day breeders and helpers may have very similar equilibrium behaviours, evidence for
the “ghost of successful invasions past” might still be sought in their genomes. Of course,
this is highly speculative, but interest in elucidating the genetic basis of helpful behaviour is
building—buoyed by the fact that genetics plays a key part in the theoretical foundations of
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sociobiology (Thompson et al., 2013). Identifying vestigial gene duplication events, if they
have occurred, could add strength to the prevailing gene-centred view of social evolution,
and maybe even quiet related debates (e.g. Laland et al., 2014).
Limitations and Future Work
The evolutionary dynamics of sex allocation were changed by the functional forms associated
with the reproductive functions—the diminishing returns and logistic paradigms. In this
paper, we disregard the scenario that led to an evolutionary branching point or possibly split
sex allocation – the logistic paradigm – and instead focus on ES sex allocation strategies given
by assuming diminishing returns. In a population with split sex allocation some individuals
would favour investment in male reproductive function and others would favour investment
in female reproductive function compared to the average allocation strategy (Grafen, 1986).
Exploring exactly how split sex allocation influences the emergence of cooperative breeding
would be an interesting avenue for future research.
Assumptions like uniform territory quality, lack of inbreeding depression, and high re-
productive skew could be relaxed and would certainly influence model predictions. We leave
the investigation of the effects due to further elaboration of our model for future work. One
important assumption – one that deserves discussion – is that of weak selection. We needed
to invoke weak selection in order to develop the inclusive-fitness interpretation of the invasion
condition (Taylor, 1989). Here, weak selection meant that the tendency to help (equivalently,
the tendency to remain on one’s natal site) was small. This is in contrast to the way in which
some authors understand weak selection: as implying that the behaviour in question has a
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small impact on fitness when expressed (Wild and Traulsen, 2007). Although it has the
advantage of allowing helping to effect appreciable benefits when expressed, our version of
weak selection ignore synergistic effects due to helpers aiding helpful breeders (Grafen, 1985).
Thus, our version of weak selection necessarily ignores benefits due to delayed reciprocity
(Wiley and Rabenold, 1984), and any associated benefits that might be realized by adjust-
ing sex allocation. Such benefits could be realized, for example, by a helper who invests
more in a breeder’s female function in an effort to secure a helper for itself in the event
it inherits the territory. Although previous theoretical work has investigated the effect of
delayed reciprocity in cooperative breeders (Kokko et al., 2001), it has not done so using an
explicit population dynamic model as we have done here. Moreover, to our knowledge, no
previous theoretical work has combined the possibility of delayed reciprocity and variable
sex allocation. Future work should address this gap.
We have presented the resource availability, above, as an environmental variable that
can help us organize our understanding about the effect helper sex allocation has on the
emergence of helping. As resource availability changes, we have also seen that the relative
importance of indirect and direct benefits of help change. When resources are abundant,
our models predict that the advantage of helping will rely primarily on direct benefits like
territory inheritance. However, when resources are scarce, our models predict that the
advantage stems primarily from the indirect benefits associated with raising non-descendant
kin. These two extremes – direct benefits on one hand, and indirect benefits on the other
– frame much of the discussion among biologists about cooperative breeding (Stacey and
Ligon, 1991; Pen and Weissing, 2000b; Clutton-Brock, 2002; Griffin and West, 2003). Future
work could explore the extent to which resource availability could act as a broader organizing
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principle for cooperative breeders, one that provides an environmental mechanism capable
of mediating a transition between importance of direct benefits and indirect benefits (and
vice versa).
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Figure 1: Comparison of the diminishing returns and logistic paradigms for reproductive
functions. Recall that a breeder has kb resources and each unit of female reproductive
function costs c~ resources. Panel (a) shows p~(α) in the diminishing returns paradigm as a
function of the fraction of resources allocated towards reproduction through female function.
In this panel we set kb/c~ = 0.2, 0.5, 1, 3, 10. Panel (b) shows p~(α) in the logistic paradigm
as a function of the fraction of resources allocated towards reproduction through female
function. In this panel we set kb/c~ = 6, 8, 12, 20, 45 with ε~ = 0.001. If both reproductive
functions (only p~ is shown in this figure) are above (resp. below) the dashed line we know
α∗ is (resp. is not) evolutionarily stable. When the reproductive functions are less than
0.5 (below the dashed line) there are increasing rates of return on investment. When the
reproductive functions are greater than 0.5 (above the dashed line) there are diminishing
returns on investment.
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Figure 2: The ES sex-allocation strategy, α∗, responds to changes in the rate of self-
ferlization, φ, and to changes in sex-specific costs of investing in reproductive function,
c~ and c|. Panels show the ES sex-allocation strategy α
∗ as a function of φ when (a) in-
vestment in male function is more costly (c~ = 0.5 and c| = 1), (b) investment in male
function and investment female function are equally costly (equation 4) (c~ = 1 and c| = 1),
and (c) investment in female function is more costly (c~ = 2 and c| = 1). The diagonal
dashed curve shows the case of extreme resource limitation, kb → 0+ (Hamilton’s local mate
competition, equation 5). The dashed horizontal curve shows the case of extreme resource
abundance, kb → ∞ (Fisher’s equal production of sexes, equation 6). Solid curves show
results for intermediate resource availability (kb = 2, 5, 10).
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Figure 3: The critical direct cost, 1−sh, as a function of helper sex allocation strategy, γ, pre-
dicted by equation (10) when φ = 0.2. Note that α∗ = 0.4 in this figure since α∗ = (1−φ)/2
in the limit as kb → 0+. Each panel presents a range of kh values, beginning at 0.5 (bottom-
most curve) and ending at 5 (top-most curve). The values are kh = 0.5, 1, 1.5, 2, 2.5, 3, 4, 5.
Panel (a) shows the case where c~ = 2 > c| = 1, panel (b) shows the case where c~ = c| = 1,
and panel(c) shows the case where c~ = 0.5 < c| = 1. Helping is favoured (resp. disfavoured)
in the region below (resp. above) a given curve (e.g. red annotation). The vertical dashed
line shows γmax = c|/(c| + c~) to highlight the qualitative change in the effect increasing
gamma has on the emergence of helping: positive effect to the left, and negative effect to
the right. The horizontal dashed line in blue is included to emphasize that increasing kh
changes only quantitative features of the effect that γ exerts on the critical direct cost, not
the qualitative ones.
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Figure 4: The critical direct cost, 1−sh, as a function of breeder ES sex allocation strategy,
α∗ = (1− φ)/2, predicted by equation (10). For ease of illustration we assume that helpers
use the allocation strategy γ = γmax = c|/(c| + c~). Each panel varies the amount of helper
resources, kh = 0.5, 1, 3, 4, 10. Panel (a) shows the case where c~ = 2 and c| = 1, panel
(b) shows the case where c~ = 1 and c| = 1, and panel (c) shows the case where c~ = 0.5
and c| = 1. Helping is favoured (resp. disfavoured) in the region below (resp. above) a
given curve. This figure demonstrates how increasing α∗ – essentially decreasing relatedness
– hinders the emergence of helpful behaviour for this limiting case (kb → 0+). For a given
amount of helper resources, reducing the cost of female units of reproduction promotes the
emergence of helpful behaviour.
32
 0
 0.5
 1
 0  0.5  1
kb increasing
H
el
pe
r 
M
or
ta
lit
y,
 
-s
h
Rate of Self Fertilization, φ
(a) c~ = 0.2
 0
 0.5
 1
 0  0.5  1
H
el
pe
r 
M
or
ta
lit
y,
 
-s
h
Rate of Self Fertilization, φ
(b) c~ = 1.0
 0
 0.5
 1
 0  0.5  1
H
el
pe
r 
M
or
ta
lit
y,
 
-s
h
Rate of Self Fertilization, φ
(c) c~ = 1.8
Figure 5: The critical direct cost, 1 − sh, for the NTI Model as a function of the rate of
self-fertilization, φ when breeders have non-vanishing levels of resource, kb. For simplicity
all plots assume γ = γmax, as this was sufficient to illustrate qualitative trends. Each panel
presents a range of kb values (kb = 0.5, 0.75, 1, 1.5, 2). Each panel also sets sb = 0.9, kh = 1,
c| = 1, but c~ is varied across panels ((a) c~ = 0.2, (b) c~ = 1, (c) c~ = 1.8). Helping is
favoured (resp. disfavoured) in the region below (resp. above) a given curve.
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Figure 6: The critical direct cost, 1 − sh, for the TI Model as a function of the rate of
self-fertilization, φ when breeders have non-vanishing levels of resource, kb. For simplicity
all plots assume γ = γmax, as this was sufficient to illustrate qualitative trends. Each panel
presents a range of kb values (kb = 0.5, 2, 3, 4). Each panel also sets sb = 0.9, kh = 1, c| = 1,
but c~ is varied across panels ((a) c~ = 0.5, (b) c~ = 0.68, (c) c~ = 1.3). Helping is favoured
(resp. disfavoured) in the region below (resp. above) a given curve.
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Appendix
A Equilibrium Solutions
For the NTI Model, the description in the main text gives us
NTI Model:
F (t+ 1) =
(
1− 1
1 + aB(t)
)
sfF (t) + p~B(t)
B(t+ 1) =
sfF (t)
1 + aB(t)
+ sbB(t)

and for the TI Model, the description in the main text gives us
TI Model:
F (t+ 1) =
(
1− 1
1 + aB(t)
)
sfF (t) + p~sbB(t)
B(t+ 1) =
sfF (t)
1 + aB(t)
+
(
sb + (1− sb)p~
)
B(t).

The equilibrium solutions and their associated stability follow trivially from Wild and
Koykka (2014) and a summary of those results are shown below. This is because the prob-
ability of producing a viable oocyte (p in their models, p~ in ours) is still defined on the
interval (0,1). In this paper, we denote the equilibrium floater and breeder densities as F¯
and B¯, respectively. The table below holds true for both the NTI and TI models when the
associated values for R0 are used. Recall that in the NTI model R0 = p~(α)
1− sb sf and in the
TI model R0 = p~(α)
1− sb
sb
1− p~(α)sf .
F¯ B¯ Condition for Stability
Trivial Equilibrium 0 0 R0 < 1
Positive Equilibrium
(
p~(α)
1− sb − 1
)
1− sb
1− sf
R0 − 1
a(1− sf )
R0 − 1
a(1− sf ) R0 > 1
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B Coefficients of Relatedness
Throughout the main text we use coefficients of relatedness that were calculated using a
coefficient of consanguinity argument. The first step in this argument is to determine the
coefficient of inbreeding, which we will call ϑ. This is the probability both alleles in an
individual are identical by descent. To find the coefficient of inbreeding in the next season
we use a simple replacement argument. The subscript n denotes the current season and the
subscript n+ 1 denotes the next season. With probability φ a breeder self-fertilizes and with
equal probability the offspring inherits two of the same allele, which are clearly identical
by descent or different alleles, which are identical by descent with probability ϑn. When a
breeder outcrosses the alleles in the offspring are never identical by descent by assumption.
Mathematically,
ϑn+1 = φ
1 + ϑn
2
.
We expect ϑn+1 = ϑn = ϑ¯ at equilibrium, and conclude the equilibrium coefficient of in-
breeding is,
ϑ¯ =
φ
2− φ .
The next part of this argument derives the desired coefficient of consanguinities (CC).
This is the blood relatedness between two individuals. To determine the CC between an
individual and itself we will choose one of their two alleles (we assume individuals are diploid)
at random, replace it, and choose again at random. Half of the time we will choose the same
allele, which is clearly identical by descent. Half of the time we will choose different alleles,
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which are identical by descent with probability ϑ¯. Mathematically,
1 + ϑ¯
2
=
1
2− φ . (B.1)
We had to calculate the CC between an individual and itself because relatedness terms
are expressed as a ratio of CCs. For example, the relatedness between an individual and
its mother is the CC between an individual and its mother divided by the CC between an
individual and itself.
Now we will calculate the relatedness between a breeder and its offspring produced
through male function as a product of outcrossing, rb,|. A quarter of the time we choose
the same allele in the paternal parent and offspring, which is clearly identical by descent.
A quarter of the time we choose different alleles (but still from the paternal parent), which
are identical by descent with probability ϑ¯. The CC between a breeder and its offspring
produced through female function is,
1 + ϑ¯
4
=
1
2
1
2− φ .
Recall that relatedness is calculated as the ratio of CCs. Following this logic, we must
divide the above equation by the CC between an individual and itself (equation (B.1)). The
coefficient of relatedness between an offspring and its paternal parent is,
rb,| =
1
2
.
Next, we will calculate the relatedness between a breeder and its offspring produced
through female function, rb,~. The CC between a breeder and its offspring produced through
female function is the the sum of two probabilities. The first occurs with probability φ, and
is when the offspring is a product of self-fertilization. Half of the time we choose the same
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allele, which is clearly identical by descent, and half of the time we choose a different allele,
which is identical by descent with probability ϑ¯. The second occurs with probability 1− φ,
and is when the offspring is a product of outcrossing. A quarter of the time we choose the
same allele, which is clearly identical by descent. A quarter of the time we choose a different
allele (but still from the maternal parent), and it is identical by descent with probability ϑ¯.
The CC between the maternal parent and an offspring produced through female function is,
φ
1 + ϑ¯
2
+ (1− φ)1 + ϑ¯
4
=
1
2
1 + φ
2− φ .
Once again, we must divide the above equation by the CC between an individual and itself
(equation (B.1)). This gives the relatedness between an individual and its maternal parent,
rb,~ =
1 + φ
2
.
We can express the relatedness between siblings with a common parent as product of
rb,~ and rb,|. The relatedness between siblings with the same maternal parent (i.e., each
individual has relatedness rb,~ with this parent) is,
rh,~ = rb,~rb,~ =
(
1 + φ
2
)2
.
The relatedness between siblings with a common parent where one is produced through
female function and the other through male function (i.e., one individual has relatedness rb,~
and the other has relatedness rb,| with this parent) is,
rh,| = rb,~rb,| =
1 + φ
4
.
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C Mutant Fitness for Sex Allocation
Since individuals are diploid and can self-fertilize, offspring may receive either zero, one,
or two copies of the mutant allele. These individuals will be referred to as homozygous
resident, heterozygous, and homozygous mutant, respectively. As mentioned in the main
text, this mutation alters an individual’s sex allocation resulting in a change to the fraction
of resources invested in male components of breeder fitness, α. The change in investment is
proportional to the number of mutant alleles an individual has. We assume additive genetic
effects. We define an individual’s sex allocation as αi = α0 + iδ, where i = 0, 1, 2 are the
number of mutant alleles an individual has and δ is the phenotypic deviation per mutant
allele. The phenotypic deviation is assumed to be small (weak selection) and can be either
positive or negative. Following the population dynamics described in the main text, the
mutant population can be described by four compartments:
• the density of heterozygous floaters, u1;
• the density of homozygous mutant floaters, u2;
• the density of heterozygous breeders, v1;
• the density of homozygous mutant breeders, v2.
C.1 Model I: No Territory Inheritance (NTI)
To carry out this invasion analysis we follow the method presented in Wild and Koykka
(2014). When there is no territory inheritance in the resident population, the dynamics of
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the mutant population is described by,
u′1
u′2
v′1
v′2

=

J11 0 J13 J14
0 J22 J23 J24
J31 0 J33 0
0 J42 0 J44

︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡J

u1
u2
v1
v2

, (C.1)
where primes denote the next time step. The non-zero entries of J are found in Table 1.
A linear stability analysis is used to find the conditions for invasion. Invasion is determined
by the magnitude of the largest eigenvalue, λ, and can be interpreted biologically as the
long term geometric growth rate. If λ < 1 the mutant, on average, is unable to replace
itself and is eliminated. However, if λ > 1 the mutant, on average, does better than replace
itself and as a result, the invasion is successful. If λ = 1 the mutant is neither eliminated
nor favoured by selection. To verify if our model is biologically reasonable, we calculate the
largest eigenvalue when there is no phenotypic change in the population (i.e., the mutant
uses the same strategy as a normal individual, δ = 0) using a computer algebra package. As
expected, we find λ = 1 in this case.
A first order Taylor expansion is used to approximate the long term geometric growth rate.
This is valid because of our weak selection assumption (δ is small). We find, λ ≈ 1−δ dλ
dδ
∣∣∣∣
δ=0
,
plus terms of O(δ2), which we ignore due to our weak selection assumption. Consequently,
invasion occurs when
dλ
dδ
∣∣∣∣
δ=0
and δ are the opposite sign. To find
dλ
dδ
∣∣∣∣
δ=0
we implicitly
differentiate the characteristic equation of J using a computer algebra package and set
δ = 0 and λ = 1. When we use the diminishing returns paradigm the selection gradient for
40
the geometric growth rate is,
dλ
dδ
∣∣∣∣
δ=0
=
2
2− φ
(1− sb)(1− sf )p~(α0)
(2− sf − sb)p~(α0)− (1− sb)2{
−rb,~
(
kh
c~
)
e−kh(1−α0)/c~
p~(α0)
+ rb,|
(
kh
c|
)
(1− φ)e
−khα0/c|
p|(α0)
}
, (C.2)
and is
dλ
dδ
∣∣∣∣
δ=0
=
2
2− φ
(1− sb)(1− sf )p~(α0)
(2− sf − sb)p~(α0)− (1− sb)2{
−rb,~kb
c~
(1− p~(α0)) + rb,|(1− φ)kb
c|
(1− p|(α0))
}
,
in the logistic paradigm. The term inside the curled brackets determines the sign of the
selection gradient. This is because the term outside the curled brackets is always positive.
Trivially, (1−sb)(1−sf )p~(α∗) > 0 and 2
2− φ > 0, but (2−sf−sb)p~(α0)−(1−sb)
2 requires
some investigation. We claim,
(2− sf − sb)p~(α0)− (1− sb)2 ,
is always positive. The above expression decreases as sf is increased. If this function is
positive when sf = 1 all other cases (0 < sf < 1) will follow trivially. After making this
substitution we obtain,
(1− sb)p~(α0)− (1− sb)2 = (1− sb)(p~(α0) + sb − 1) .
For positivity, we require (p~(α0) + sb − 1) > 0. By assumption, R0 = p~(α0)sf
1− sb > 1 so we
know p~(α0) > p~(α0)sf > 1− sb, which easily rearranges to p~(α0) + sb−1 > 0. This proves
the expression outside the curled brackets in equation (C.2) is always positive. As a result,
the mutant invades when the term inside the curled braces and the phenotypic deviation, δ,
are the opposite sign.
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C.2 Model II: Territory Inheritance (TI)
When there is no territory inheritance in the resident population the dynamics of the mutant
population is described by,

u′1
u′2
v′1
v′2

=

K11 0 K13 K14
0 K22 K23 K24
K31 0 K33 K34
0 K42 K43 K44

︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡K

u1
u2
v1
v2

, (C.3)
where prime denotes the next time step. The non-zero entries of K can be found in Table 2.
Following the previous section, we calculate the largest eigenvalue using a computer algebra
package when there is no phenotypic change in the population (i.e., the mutant uses the
same strategy as a normal individual) as a check. We find λ = 1 in this case, which again is
expected.
We use the same approximation for the long-term geometric growth rate of the mutant
population, λ ≈ 1 − δ dλ
dδ
∣∣∣∣
δ=0
, and recall that invasion happens when
dλ
dδ
∣∣∣∣
δ=0
and δ are
the opposite sign. Similar to the NTI model, we implicitly differentiate the characteristic
equation ofK using a computer algebra package and set δ = 0 and λ = 1 . In the diminishing
returns paradigm the expression for the selection gradient of the long term geometric growth
rate is,
dλ
dδ
∣∣∣∣
δ=0
=
2
2− φ
(1− sb)(1− sf )sbp~(α0)
(s2b − sb(2 + sf ) + 2)p~(α0)− (1− sb)2 − (1− sb)p~(α0)2{
−rb,~
(
kh
c~
)
1− p~(α0)
p~(α0)
+ rb,|
(
kh
c|
)
(1− φ)1− p|(α0)
p|(α0)
}
, (C.4)
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and is
dλ
dδ
∣∣∣∣
δ=0
=
2
2− φ
(1− sb)(1− sf )sbp~(α0)
(s2b − sb(2 + sf ) + 2)p~(α0)− (1− sb)2 − (1− sb)p~(α0)2{
−rb,~kb
c~
(1− p~(α0)) + rb,|(1− φ)kb
c|
(1− p|(α0))
}
,
in the logistic paradigm. The term inside the curled braces determines the sign of the
selection gradient. This is because we claim the term in the denominator outside of the
curled braces is always positive. Once again, it is easy to see (1 − sb)(1 − sf )sbp~(α0) > 0
and
2
2− φ > 0, but the sign of the denominator is unclear. We must show,
(s2b − sb(2 + sf ) + 2)p~(α0)− (1− sb)2 − (1− sb)p~(α0)2 > 0 .
The LHS of the inequality above is a decreasing function of sf and we are interested in its
value when sf = 1. If the above inequality holds true in this case, it will trivially hold for
all other cases when 0 < sf < 1. After making this substitution we must now show,
(s2b − 3sb + 2)p~(α0)− (1− sb)2− (1− sb)p~(α0)2 = (1− sb)(1− p~(α0))(p~(α0) + sb− 1) > 0 .
Similar to the NTI model, the proof relies on (p~(α0) + sb− 1) being positive, which is again
true because of the assumption that R0 = p~(α0)sf
1− sb
sb
1− p~(α0) > 1. We find p~(α0)sb >
p~(α0)sbsf > (1− sb)(1−p~(α0)), which easily rearranges to p~(α0) + sb− 1 > 0, as required.
As a result, we conclude that the mutant invades whenever the term inside the curled braces
and the phenotypic deviation, δ, are the opposite sign.
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D Classifying Strategies – Diminishing Returns
D.1 Evolutionary Equilibrium (EE)
The condition for the evolutionary equilibrium is
dλ
dδ
∣∣∣∣
δ=0
= 0, and we solve for α0 = α
∗.
Based on equation (C.2) and (C.4) we can easily see that these conditions are the same as
the one found in the main text. For a sex allocation to be an evolutionary equilibrium it
must satisfy,
−rb,~
(
kb
c~
)
1− p~(α∗)
p~(α∗)
+ rb,|(1− φ)
(
kb
c|
)
1− p|(α∗)
p|(α∗)
= 0 . (D.1)
We require φ ∈ [0, 1). The above equation can be solved explicitly for α∗ when the costs of
reproduction are equal (c~ = c| = c), and numerically for all other cases. This expression
is,
α∗ =
c
kb
log
(
φ+
√
φ2 + (1− φ2)ekb/c
1 + φ
)
.
D.2 Evolutionarily Stable (ES)
To determine whether an EE strategy, α∗, is ES we use a derivative condition from Courteau
& Lessard (2000). Since we assume the genetic effects are additive we know that α2 =
2α1 − α0, which is an essential redefinition to make use of the results from their paper.
Biologically, when a strategy is ES it means that all other strategies provide a lower fitness,
and as a result cannot invade. The strategy α∗ is ES when
∂2fNTI
∂α21
∣∣∣∣
α1=α0=α∗
> 0 , where fNTI = det(I−J (α0, α1)) , (D.2)
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for the NTI model and
∂2fTI
∂α21
∣∣∣∣
α1=α0=α∗
> 0 , where fTI = det(I−K(α0, α1)) , (D.3)
for the TI model, where I is the identity matrix. The invasion matrices J and K are
discussed in equations (C.1) and (C.2), respectively.
D.2.1 NTI Model
We use a computer algebra package to check the derivative condition in equation (D.2). To
simplify the output we make use of the fact that all candidate ES strategies are EE. With
this simplification, the resulting condition is
2kb
2 (1− sf )2 (1− sb)2 p~3 (1− p|)2 (1− p~) (c~ + c|)
c| (c~ p~ p| + c| p~ p| − c~ p~ − c| p|)2 (p~ + sb − 1)2
> 0 ,
which is clearly always positive. Thus, when we assume diminishing returns, α∗ is always
ES in the TI model.
D.2.2 TI Model
Similar to the NTI model, we use a computer algebra package to check the derivative con-
dition in equation (D.3). Again, we simplify the output by knowing that all candidate ES
strategies are also EE. The resulting condition is
2kb
2s2b (1− sf )2 (1− sb)2 p~3 (1− p|)2 (1− p~) (c~ + c|)
c| (c~ p~ p| + c| p~ p| − c~ p~ − c| p|)2 (p~ + sb − 1)2
> 0 ,
which, again, is always positive. Thus, by assuming diminishing returns, α∗ is always ES in
the NTI model.
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D.3 Convergence Stable (CS)
To determine whether the EE strategy, α∗, is CS we use the derivative condition
d
dα
[
∂W
∂β
∣∣∣∣
β=α
]
α=α∗
< 0 ,
discussed in Taylor (1996). When a strategy is CS it means that the direction from which
selection approaches the EE strategy does not matter. This calculation is the same for both
the NTI and TI model. Note that when we assume diminishing returns for the reproductive
functions
dp~(X)
dX
= −kb
c~
(1− p~(X)) and dp|(X)
dX
=
kb
c|
(1− p|(X)) ,
where X = α, β. We begin with the expression for fitness, W , found in the manuscript. The
proof for CS is as follows:
W = rb,~
p~(β)
p~(α)
+ rb,|(1− φ)p|(β)
p|(α)
∂W
∂β
∣∣∣∣
β=α
= −rb,~kb
c~
1− pf (α)
p~(α)
+ rb,|(1− φ)kb
c|
1− p|(α)
p|(α)
∂W
∂β
∣∣∣∣
β=α
= −rb,~kb
c~
(
1
p~(α)
− 1
)
+ rb,|(1− φ)kb
c|
(
1
p|(α)
− 1
)
d
dα
[
∂W
∂β
∣∣∣∣
β=α
]
α=α∗
= −rb,~k
2
b
c2~
1− p~(α∗)
p2~(α
∗)
− rb,|(1− φ)k
2
b
c2|
1− p|(α∗)
p2|(α
∗)
< 0

.
Thus, α∗ is always CS in both the NTI and TI models when we assume diminishing returns
for the reproductive functions.
D.4 Limited resources (kb → 0+)
The ES sex allocation in these models is Hamilton’s Local Mate Competition (LMC) result
when breeders are extremely resource limited. We use the approximation p~ ≈ kb(1 −
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x)/c~ +O((−kb(1− x)/c~)2) and p| ≈ kbx/c| +O((−kbx/c|)2), which are first order Taylor
expansions. Substituting these approximations into the corresponding fitness function (in
the main text), we find,
W (β, α) ≈ Wapprox(β, α) = rb,~ kb(1− β)/c~ +O((−kb(1− β)/c~)
2)
kb(1− α)/c~ +O((−kb(1− α)/c~)2)
+ rb,|(1− φ)kbβ/c| +O((−kbβ/c|)
2)
kbα/c| +O((−kbα/c|)2) .
In the limit as kb → 0+ the higher order terms approach zero. After taking this limit the
expression becomes,
Wapprox(β, α) = rb,~
1− β
1− α + rb,|(1− φ)
β
α
.
We differentiate the above equation with respect to β to find the condition for a sex allocation
to be an evolutionary equilibrium in this limiting case. This condition is,
∂Wapprox(β, α)
∂β
∣∣∣∣
β=α=α∗
= −rb,~ 1
1− α∗ + rb,|(1− φ)
1
α∗
= 0 .
Recall rb,~ = (1 +φ)/2 and rb,| = 1/2. Solving the above derivative condition for α
∗ we find,
α∗ =
1− φ
2
.
D.5 Unlimited resources (kb →∞)
We show that in the limit as kb →∞ (breeders become resource unlimited) the evolutionary
equilibrium breeder sex allocation, α∗, reduces to a simple expression involving sex specific
costs of reproduction. Mathematically, we recover,
α∗ =
c|
c| + c~
.
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Before we take this limit we must first do some rearrangement. For a breeder sex alloca-
tion to be an evolutionary equilibrium, α = α∗, it must satisfy,
− rb,~
(
kb
c~
)(
1− p~
p~
)
+ rb,|(1− φ)
(
kb
c|
)(
1− p|
p|
)
= 0
=⇒ − rb,~
(
1
c~
)(
1− p~
p~
)
+ rb,|(1− φ)
(
1
c|
)(
1− p|
p|
)
= 0
=⇒ rb,~
(
1
c~
)(
1− p~
p~
)
= rb,|(1− φ)
(
1
c|
)(
1− p|
p|
)
=⇒ rb,~
rb,|(1− φ)
c|
c~
=
(
1− p|
p|
)(
p~
1− p~
)
=⇒ log
{
rb,~
rb,|(1− φ)
c|
c~
}
= log
{(
1− p|
p|
)(
p~
1− p~
)}

.
Since c~, c|, rb,~, and rb,| are all positive, p~ and p| are defined on the interval (0, 1),
and φ is defined on the interval [0, 1), the above step is justified. For the subsequent steps
of this proof let a = log
{
rb,~
rb,|(1− φ)
c|
c~
}
. Note that this expression does not depend on the
amount of breeder resources, kb, since rb,~ = (1 + φ)/2 and rb,| = 1/2. Recall that when
α = α∗, p~ = 1 − exp{−kb(1 − α∗)/c~} and p| = 1 − exp{−kbα∗/c|}. From the above
equation we know that
a = log
{(
1− p|
p|
)(
p~
1− p~
)}
= log {1− p|} − log {p|}+ log {p~} − log {1− p~}
= log
{
e−kbα
∗/c|
}− log {1− e−kbα∗/c|}+ log {1− e−kb(1−α∗)/c~}− log {e−kb(1−α∗)/c~}
= −kbα
∗
c|
− log {1− e−kbα∗/c|}+ log {1− e−kb(1−α∗)/c~}+ kb(1− α∗)
c~

.
With some rearrangement we find,
α∗ =
c|
c| + c~
+
1
kb
(
c|c~
c| + c~
)(
log
{
1− e−kb(1−α∗)/c~}− log {1− e−kbα∗/c|}− a) .
The prior steps isolated the terms that do not shrink as kb becomes large, which allows
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us to take the limit as kb →∞ and recover important results. The limit is
lim
kb→∞
α∗ = lim
kb→∞
c|
c| + c~
+ lim
kb→∞
1
kb
c|c~
c| + c~
(
log
{
1− e−kb(1−α∗)/c~}− log {1− e−kbα∗/c|}− a) .
We substitute the value of a back into the above equation to easily take all limits. The
resulting limit is
lim
kb→∞
α∗ = lim
kb→∞
c|
c| + c~
+ lim
kb→∞
1
kb
c|c~
c| + c~
(
log
{
1− e−kb(1−α∗)/c~}− log {1− e−kbα∗/c|})
− lim
kb→∞
1
kb
c|c~
c| + c~
(
log
{
rb,~
rb,|(1− φ)
c|
c~
})
.
Both logarithms that depend on kb approach 0, and the denominator of the last two
limits approach ∞. Finally, as breeders become resource unlimited, we find
α∗ =
c|
c| + c~
.
E Classifying Strategies – Logistic
E.1 Evolutionary Equilibrium (EE)
The EE sex allocation, α∗, occurs when
∂W
∂β
∣∣∣∣
β=α
= −rb,~kb
c~
(1− p~(α)) + rb,|(1− φ)kb
c|
(1− p|(α)) = 0 ,
for both the NTI and TI models when we assume the reproductive functions are logistic.
This condition was verified using the method discussed in appendix C, but using logistic
reproductive functions. This condition is verified using the eigenvalues of the invasion matrix.
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E.2 Evolutionarily Stable (ES)
Using the method discussed in appendix D.2 we are able to determine whether an EE strat-
egy, α∗, is ES.
E.2.1 NTI Model
We use a computer algebra package to check the derivative condition in equation (D.2)
assuming that all reproductive functions are logistic. To simplify the output we make use
of the fact that all candidate ES strategies are EE. With this simplification, the resulting
condition is
4kb
2 (1− sf )2 (1− sb)2 (1− p|)2 (1− p~) p~2
c2|c~ (c~ p| + c| p~ − c~ − c|)2 (p~ + sb − 1)2
{
1
c~
(
p~ − 1
2
)
+
1
c|
(
p| − 1
2
)}
.
Clearly, the term outside the curled braces in the above equation is always positive. Thus,
α∗ is ES in the NTI model when
1
c~
(
p~ − 1
2
)
+
1
c|
(
p| − 1
2
)
> 0 .
E.2.2 TI Model
Again, we use a computer algebra package to check the derivative condition in equation (D.3)
assuming that all reproductive functions are logistic. We again can simplify the output since
all ES strategies are EE. After this simplification, the resulting condition is
4kb
2s2b (1− sf )2 (1− sb)2 (1− p|)2 (1− p~) p~2
c2|c~ (c~ p| + c| p~ − c~ − c|)2 (p~ + sb − 1)2
{
1
c~
(
p~ − 1
2
)
+
1
c|
(
p| − 1
2
)}
.
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As with the NTI model the term outside the curled braces is always positive. Thus, α∗ is
ES in the TI model when
1
c~
(
p~ − 1
2
)
+
1
c|
(
p| − 1
2
)
> 0 .
E.3 Convergence Stable (CS)
We use the same method discussed in appendix D.3 to determine whether α∗ is CS. Note
that when we assume the reproductive functions are logistic the derivatives are
dp~(X)
dX
= −kb
c~
p~(X)(1− p~(X)) and dp|(X)
dX
=
kb
c|
p|(X)(1− p|(X)) ,
where X = α, β. We begin with the expression for fitness, W , found in the manuscript. The
proof for CS is as follows:
W = rb,~
p~(β)
p~(α)
+ rb,|(1− φ)p|(β)
p|(α)
∂W
∂β
∣∣∣∣
β=α
= −rb,~kb
c~
p~(α)(1− p~(α))
p~(α)
+ rb,|(1− φ)kb
c|
p|(α)(1− p|(α))
p|(α)
∂W
∂β
∣∣∣∣
β=α
= −rb,~kb
c~
(1− p~(α)) + rb,|(1− φ)kb
c|
(1− p|(α))
d
dα
[
∂W
∂β
∣∣∣∣
β=α
]
α=α∗
= −rb,~k
2
b
c2~
p~(α
∗)(1− p~(α∗))− rb,|(1− φ)k
2
b
c2|
p|(α
∗)(1− p|(α∗)) < 0

.
Thus, α∗ is always CS in both the NTI and TI models when we assume the reproductive
functions are logistic.
F Mutant Fitness for Helpful Behaviour
Once again, the inclusion of self-fertilization causes us to consider both heterozygous, and
homozygous mutant individuals in the invasion analysis. We assume that the breeder sex-
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allocation strategy is at its ES value, α∗. By following a similar method as we did when
studying the evolution of sex allocation, we are able to determine when helpful behaviour
is selectively advantageous in a previously selfish population. In this scenario, the mutant
allele causes a phenotypic deviation, ε ≥ 0, in the offspring dispersal rate. This deviation
cannot be negative since selfish individuals are not able to disperse more frequently than
they already do. We define di = 1− i
2
ε, as the dispersal rate of an offspring from their natal
patch. Once again, i = 0, 1, 2 and is the number of copies of the mutant allele an individual
has. We are interested in determining the condition for helpful behaviour to emerge in both
the NTI and TI models. Unlike the prior sex allocation results, the conditions for invasion
differ between the two models. Following the population dynamics set out in the main text,
the mutant population can be described by nine compartments:
• the density of heterozygous floaters, u1;
• the density of homozygous mutant floaters, u2;
• the density of homozygous normal breeders with heterozygous helpers, v01
• the density of solitary heterozygous breeders, v1•;
• the density of heterozygous breeders with heterozygous helpers, v11;
• the density of heterozygous breeders with homozygous mutant helpers, v12;
• the density of solitary homozygous mutant breeders, v2•;
• the density of homozygous mutant breeders with heterozygous helpers, v21;
• the density of homozygous mutant breeders with homozygous mutant helpers, v22;
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F.1 Model I: No Territory Inheritance (NTI)
We again follow the steps outline in Wild and Koykka (2014) for this invasion analysis.
When there is no territory inheritance in the resident population the dynamics of the mutant
population is described by,
u′1
u′2
v′01
v′1•
v′11
v′12
v′2•
v′21
v′22

=

G11 0 G13 G14 G15 G16 G17 G18 G19
0 G22 0 G24 G25 G26 G27 G28 G29
0 0 0 G34 G35 G36 G37 G38 G39
G41 0 G43 G44 G45 G46 0 G48 0
0 0 0 G54 G55 G56 0 G58 0
0 0 0 G64 G65 G66 0 G68 0
0 G72 0 0 0 G76 G77 G78 G79
0 0 0 0 0 G86 G87 G88 G89
0 0 0 0 0 G96 G97 G98 G99

︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡G

u1
u2
v01
v1•
v11
v12
v2•
v21
v22

, (F.1)
where prime denotes the next time step. The non-zero entries of G can be found in Tables
3-6. As a check we calculate the largest eigenvalue when there is no phenotypic change in
the population (i.e., the mutant uses the same strategy as a normal individual, ε = 0). We
find λ = 1 in this case, which is expected because an individual following the same strategy
as in the resident population should neither be eliminated nor favoured by selection.
As before, we make an approximation to the long term geometric growth rate, λ, using
a Taylor expansion and recall that mutant invasion occurs when λ > 1. The approximation
for the long term geometric growth rate for helpful behaviour is λ ≈ 1 + ε
2
dλ
dε
∣∣∣∣
ε=0
plus
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terms of order O(ε2), which we can ignore because of the weak selection assumption. Since
ε ≥ 0, mutant invasion occurs when dλ
dε
∣∣∣∣
ε=0
is positive. To find this expression we implicitly
differentiate the characteristic equation of G using a computer algebra package and set ε = 0
and λ = 1. For brevity, p~ ≡ p~(α∗), q~ ≡ q~(α∗, γ), p| ≡ p|(α∗), and q| ≡ q|(α∗, γ) below.
We find,
dλ
dε
∣∣∣∣
ε=0
=
1
2− φ
(1− sb)(1− sf )p~sb
(2− sf − sb)p~ − (1− sb)2{
rh,~(q~ − p~) + rh,|(1− φ)
(
q|
p|
− 1
)
p~ + sh(1− sb)
(
p~
1− sb − 1
)
− (1− sh)
}
. (F.2)
The term outside the curled brackets is always positive when R0 > 1 and the argument
follows from the one presented in section C.1. The term in the curled brackets (note that it
is the same as the one found in the main text) determines the sign of the selection gradient
and when positive, mutant invasion occurs.
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F.2 Model II: Territory Inheritance (TI)
When there is territory inheritance in the normal population the dynamics of the mutant
population is described by,
u′1
u′2
v′01
v′1•
v′11
v′12
v′2•
v′21
v′22

=

H11 0 H13 H14 H15 H16 H17 H18 H19
0 H22 0 H24 H25 H26 H27 H28 H29
0 0 0 H34 H35 H36 H37 H38 H39
H41 0 H43 H44 H45 H46 H47 H48 H49
0 0 0 H54 H55 H56 0 H58 0
0 0 0 H64 H65 H66 0 H68 0
0 H72 0 H74 H75 H76 H77 H78 H79
0 0 0 0 0 H86 H87 H88 H89
0 0 0 0 0 H96 H97 H98 H99

︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡H

u1
u2
v01
v1•
v11
v12
v2•
v21
v22

, (F.3)
where prime denotes the next time ste. The non-zero entries of H can be found in Tables 7-
11. To check if our model is biologically reasonable we calculate the largest eigenvalue when
there is no phenotypic change in the population (i.e., the mutant uses the same strategy as
a normal individual, ε = 0). We find λ = 1 in this case, which again is expected.
The approximation λ ≈ 1 + ε
2
dλ
dε
∣∣∣∣
ε=0
is still used for the long-term geometric growth
rate of the mutant population in this model. As before, the fact that ε ≥ 0 causes mutant
invasion to occur when
dλ
dε
∣∣∣∣
ε=0
is positive. To find
dλ
dε
∣∣∣∣
ε=0
we implicitly differentiate the
characteristic equation of H using a computer algebra package and set ε = 0 and λ = 1.
Once again for brevity, p~ ≡ p~(α∗), q~ ≡ q~(α∗, γ), p| ≡ p|(α∗), and q| ≡ q|(α∗, γ) below.
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We find,
dλ
dε
∣∣∣∣
ε=0
=
1
2− φ
(1− sb)(1− sf )s2bp~
(s2b − sb(2 + sf ) + 2)p~ − (1− sb)2 − (1− sb)p2~{
rh,~(q~ − p~)(1− sh + shsbvf ) + rh,|(1− φ)
(
q|
p|
− 1
)
p~
+sh(1− sb)(vi − vf )− (1− sh)vf − sh(1− sb)rh,~(p~vi − q~vf )
}
. (F.4)
The term outside the curled brackets is always positive when R0 > 1 and the argument
follows the one presented in section C.2. The term in the curled brackets (note that it is the
same as the one found in the main text) determines the sign of the selection gradient and
when positive, mutant invasion occurs.
G Optimal Resource Allocation for a Helper
Now we will go through our derivation for the optimal resource allocation, which we call
γmax. We collect the terms of the inclusive fitness expression that the helper can directly
influence (i.e., terms inside the curled brackets involving q~ or q| in equations (F.2) and
(F.4)). The collection of terms is,
M = v~rh,~
q~(α
∗, γ)
p~(α∗)
+ v|rh,|(1− φ)q|(α
∗, γ)
p|(α∗)
,
where rh,~ = (1+φ)
2/4, rh,| = (1+φ)/4, v| = 1, and finally, in the NTI model v~ = 1 and in
the TI model v~ = (1−sh)+shvf . Recall vf = p~
1− sb . To find the maximizing helper resource
allocation, γmax, we take the first derivative with respect to this parameter, and solve for
when the derivative condition is equal to zero. Note that rh,~ = rb,~rb,~ and rh,| = rb,|rb,~ as
discussed in Appendix B and recall q~(α
∗, γ) = 1− exp{−(kb(1− α∗) + kh(1− γ))/c~} and
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q|(α
∗, γ) = 1− exp{−(kbα∗ + khγ)/c|}. The derivative condition is,
∂M
∂γ
∣∣∣∣
γ=γmax
= rb,~
[
−v~rb,~
(
kh
c|
)
e−kb(1−α
∗)/c~
p~(α∗)
e−kh(1−γmax)/c~
+ v|rb,|(1− φ)
(
kh
c|
)
e−kbα
∗/c|
p|(α∗)
e−khγmax/c|
]
= 0 . (G.1)
Since the population is using strategy α∗, the term in curled braces in equations (C.2) and
(C.4) must be equal to zero. Consequently, we know,
rb,~
e−kb(1−α
∗)/c~
p~(α∗)
= rb,|(1− φ)e
−kbα∗/c|
p|(α∗)
= ζ .
The above expression is then substituted into equation (G.1) and we now require,
ζrb,~kh
[−v~e−kh(1−γmax)/c~ + v|e−khγmax/c|] = 0 . (G.2)
Now we can explicitly solve for γmax and it is,
γmax = min
{
c|
c| + c~
+
(
kh
c|
+
kh
c~
)−1
log
(
v|
v~
)
, 1
}
.
The minimum appears because mathematically γmax cannot exceed 1, but is not biologically
reasonable. It is easy to verify that γmax is indeed the helper sex allocation that provides the
greatest inclusive fitness effect. This is proven by taking the partial derivative of equation
(G.2), (essentially the 2nd derivative of M) with respect to γ. It follows trivially that,
∂
∂γ
ζrb,~kh
[−v~e−kh(1−γ)/c~ + v|e−khγ/c|]
= ζrb,~kh
[
−v~kh
c~
e−kh(1−γ)/c~ − v|kh
c|
e−khγ/c|
]
< 0 .
Since the above condition is always negative we know γmax maximizes equation (G.1).
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Table 1: Model I - Expressions for non-zero entires in matrix J (equation (C.1)).
Matrix Entry Expression
Column 1
J11
(
1− 1
1 + aB¯
)
sf
J31 sf
1 + aB¯
Column 2
J22
(
1− 1
1 + aB¯
)
sf
J42 sf
1 + aB¯
Column 3
J13 1
2
φp~(α1) +
1
2
(1− φ)p~(α1) + 1
2
(1− φ)p~(α0)p|(α1)
p|(α0)
J23 1
4
φp~(α1)
J33 sb
Column 4
J14 (1− φ)p~(α2) + (1− φ)p~(α0)p|(α2)
p|(α0)
J24 φp~(α2)
J44 sb
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Table 2: Model II - Expressions for non-zero entires in matrix K ( equation (C.3)).
Matrix Entry Expression
Column 1
K11
(
1− 1
1 + aB¯
)
sf
K31 sf
1 + aB¯
Column 2
K22
(
1− 1
1 + aB¯
)
sf
K42 sf
1 + aB¯
Column 3
K13 sb
(
1
2
φp~(α1) +
1
2
(1− φ)p~(α1) + 1
2
(1− φ)p~(α0)p|(α1)
p|(α0)
)
K23 sb1
4
φp~(α1)
K33 sb + (1− sb)
(
1
2
φp~(α1) +
1
2
(1− φ)p~(α1) + 1
2
(1− φ)p~(α0)p|(α1)
p|(α0)
)
K43 (1− sb)1
4
φp~(α1)
Column 4
K14 sb
(
(1− φ)p~(α2) + (1− φ)p~(α0)p|(α2)
p|(α0)
)
K24 sbφp~(α2)
K34 (1− sb)
(
(1− φ)p~(α2) + (1− φ)p~(α0)p|(α2)
p|(α0)
)
K44 sb + (1− sb)φp~(α2)
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Table 3: Model I - Expressions for non-zero entires in matrix G (equation (F.1)).
Matrix Entry Expression
Column 1
G11
(
1− 1
1 + aB¯
)
sf
G41 sf
1 + aB¯
Column 2
G22
(
1− 1
1 + aB¯
)
sf
G72 sf
1 + aB¯
Column 3
G13 shsb
G43 sh(1− sb)
Column 4
G14 1
2
p~ (1− (1− d1) sb) (2− φ)
G24 1
4
φ p~ (1− (1− d2) sb)
G34 1
2
(1− φ) p~sb (1− d1)
G44 sb
(
1−
(
1
4
(1− d2)φ+ 1
2
(1− d1)
)
p~
)
G54 1
2
p~sb (1− d1)
G64 1
4
φ p~sb (1− d2)
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Table 4: Model I - Expressions for non-zero entires in matrix G (equation (F.1)).
Matrix Entry Expression
Column 5
G15 1
2
(1− (1− d1) ((1− sh) sb + sh)) q~ + sb sh + 1
2
q|
p|
(1− (1− d1) sb) (1− φ) pf
G25 1
4
φ (1− (1− d2) (sh + (1− s)sb)) q~
G35 1
2
q|
p|
(1− φ) p~sb (1− d1)
G45 1
4
((1− sh) sb + sh)
(
1−
(
1
4
(1− d2)φ+ 1
2
(1− d1)
)
q~
)
G55 1
2
((1− sh) sb + sh) q~ (1− d1)
G65 1
4
((1− sh) sb + sh)φ q~ (1− d2)
Column 6
G16 1
2
q~ (1− (1− d1) ((1− sh) sb + sh)) + 1
2
q|
p|
(1− (1− d1) sb) (1− φ) p~
G26 1
4
φ (1− (1− d2) ((1− sh) sb + sh)) q~ + shsb
G36 1
2
q|
p|
(1− φ) p~sb (1− d1)
G46
(
1−
(
1
4
(1− d2)φ+ 1
2
(1− d1)
)
q~
)
sb
G56 1
2
q~sb (1− d1)
G66 1
4
φ q~sb (1− d2)
G76
(
1−
(
1
4
(1− d2)φ+ 1
2
(1− d1)
)
q~
)
sh (1− sb)
G86 1
2
q~sh (1− sb) (1− d1)
G96 1
4
φ q~sh (1− sb) (1− d2)
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Table 5: Model I - Expressions for non-zero entires in matrix G (equation (F.1)).
Matrix Entry Expression
Column 7
G17 2 (1− φ) p~ (1− (1− d1) sb)
G27 p~ (1− (1− d2) sb)φ
G37 (1− φ) p~sb (1− d1)
G77 sb (1− (1− (1− φ) d1 − φ d2) p~)
G87 (1− φ) p~sb (1− d1)
G97 φ p~sb (1− d2)
Column 8
G18 (1− (1− d1) ((1− sh) sb + sh)) q~ (1− φ) + sb sh + q|
p|
(1− (1− d1) sb) (1− φ) p~
G28 φ q~ (1− (1− d2) ((1− s) sb + sh))
G38 q|
p|
(1− φ) p~sb (1− d1)
G48 (1− (1− (1− φ) d1 − φ d2) q~) sh (1− sb)
G58 (1− φ) q~s (1− sb) (1− d1)
G68 φ q~sh (1− sb) (1− d2)
G78 (1− (1− (1− φ) d1 − φ d2) q~) sb
G88 (1− φ) q~sb (1− d1)
G98 φ q~sb (1− d2)
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Table 6: Model I - Expressions for non-zero entires in matrix G (equation (F.1)).
Matrix Entry Expression
Column 9
G19 (1− (1− d1) ((1− sh) sb + sh)) q~ (1− φ) + q|
p|
(1− (1− d1) sb) (1− φ)pf
G29 φ q~ (1− (1− d2) ((1− sh) sb + sh)) + shsb
G39 q|
p|
(1− φ) p~sb (1− d1)
G79 (1− (1− (1− φ) d1 − φ d2) q~) ((1− sh) sb + sh)
G89 (1− φ) (1− d1) q~ ((1− sh) sb + sh)
G99 φ (1− d2) q~ ((1− sh) sb + sh)
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Table 7: Model II - Expressions for non-zero entires in matrix H (equation (F.3)).
Matrix Entry Expression
Column 1
H11
(
1− 1
1 + aB¯
)
sf
H41 sf
1 + aB¯
Column 2
H22
(
1− 1
1 + aB¯
)
sf
H72 sf
1 + aB¯
Column 3
H13 shsb
H43 sh(1− sb)
Column 4
H14 1
2
p~sb d1 (2− φ)
H24 1
4
φ p~sb d2
H34 1
2
(1− φ) p~sb (1− d1)
H44 1
2
p~sb d1 +
1
4
φ p~sb d2 + (1− p~) sb + 1
2
φ p~ (1− sb) + (1− φ) p~ (1− sb) +
1
2
(1− φ) p~sb + 1
4
φ p~sb
H54 1
2
p~sb (1− d1)
H64 1
4
φ p~sb (1− d2)
H74 1
4
φ p~ (1− sb)
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Table 8: Model II - Expressions for non-zero entires in matrix H (equation (F.3)).
Matrix Entry Expression
Column 5
H15 1
2
q~ ((1− s) sb + sh) d1 + ssb + 1
2
q|
p|
(1− φ) p~sb d1
H25 1
4
φ d2q~ ((1− sh) sb + sh)
H35 1
2
q|
p|
(1− φ) p~sb (1− d1)
H45 1
2
q|
p|
(1− φ) p~ (1− sb) + qf ((1− sh) sb + sh)
(
1
2
d1 +
1
4
φ d2
)
+
1
2
q~ +
(sh + (1− sh) sb)
(
1− 1
4
(φ+ 4) q~
)
H55 1
2
(1− d1) q~ ((1− sh) sb + sh)
H65 1
4
φ (1− d2) q~ ((1− sh) sb + sh)
H75 1
4
φ q~ (1− sh) (1− sb)
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Table 9: Model II - Expressions for non-zero entires in matrix H (equation (F.3)).
Matrix Entry Expression
Column 6
H16 1
2
q|
p|
(1− φ) p~sb d1 + 1
2
q~ ((1− sh) sb + sh) d1
H26 1
4
φ d2q~ ((1− sh) sb + sh) + ssb
H36 1
2
q|
p|
(1− φ) p~sb (1− d1)
H46 1
2
q|
p|
(1− φ) p~ (1− sb) + φqfsb
(
1
2
d1 +
1
4
d2
)
+
1
2
(1− sh) (1− sb) q~ +(
1− 1
4
q~ (2 + φ)
)
sb
H56 1
2
q~sb (1− d1)
H66 1
4
φ q~sb (1− d2)
H76 1
2
(1− sb)
(
1
2
φq~ + sh (1− φ q~) + sh (1− q~)
)
+
1
2
shqfd1(1 − sb) +
1
4
φqfsh(1− sb)d2
H86 1
2
q~sh (1− sb) (1− d1)
H96 1
2
φ q~sh (1− sb) (1− d2)
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Table 10: Model II - Expressions for non-zero entires in matrix H (equation (F.3)).
Matrix Entry Expression
Column 7
H17 2 (1− φ) p~sb d1
H27 φ p~sb d2
H37 (1− φ) p~sb (1− d1)
H47 2 (1− φ) p~ (1− sb)
H77 (1− φ) sb (p~d1 + 1− p~) + φ p~ (1− sb + sb d2) + φ (1− p~) sb
H87 (1− φ) p~sb (1− d1)
H97 φ p~sb (1− d2)
Column 8
H18 q|
p|
(1− φ) p~sb d1 + ((1− sh) sb + sh) (1− φ) q~d1 + ssb
H28 φ d2q~ ((1− sh) sb + sh)
H38 q|
p|
(1− φ) p~sb (1− d1)
H48 q|
p|
(1− φ) p~ (1− sb) + (1− φ) q~sh (1− sb) d1 + φ q~sh (1− sb) d2 +
(1− sb) ((1− φ) q~ (1− sh) + sh (1− q~))
H58 (1− φ) q~sh (1− sb) (1− d1)
H68 φ q~sh (1− sb) (1− d2)
H78 qfsbd1(1− φ) + φqfsbd2 + φ q~ (1− sh) (1− sb) + (1− qf ) sb
H88 (1− φ) q~sb (1− d1)
H98 φ q~sb (1− d2)
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Table 11: Model II - Expressions for non-zero entires in matrix H (equation (F.3)).
Matrix Entry Expression
Column 9
H19 q|
p|
(1− φ) p~sb d1 + ((1− sh) sb + sh) (1− φ) q~d1
H29 φ d2q~ ((1− sh) sb + sh) + shsb
H39 q|
p|
(1− φ) p~sb (1− d1)
H49 (1− φ) q~ (1− sh) (1− sb) + q|
p|
(1− φ) p~ (1− sb)
H79 d1 (1− φ) q~ ((1− sh) sb + sh) + ((1− sh) sb + sh) q~φ d2 +
φ q~ (1− sh − (1− sh) sb) + (sh + (1− sh) sb) (1− q~)
H89 (1− d1) (1− φ) q~ ((1− sh) sb + sh)
H99 φ (1− d2) q~ ((1− sh) sb + sh)
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